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Cadres decide everything – Turkey’s reform of its military
Mateusz Chudziak
Over the last two years, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerı – TSK) have been sub-
ject to transformations with no precedent in the history of Turkey as a republic. The process 
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) subordinating the army to civilian government 
has accelerated following the failed coup that took place on 15 July 2016. The government has 
managed to take away the autonomy of the armed forces which, while retaining their enor-
mous significance within the state apparatus, ceased to be the main element consolidating 
the old Kemalist elites. However, the unprecedented scale of the purges and the introduc-
tion of formal civilian control of the military are merely a prelude to a much more profound 
change intended to create a brand new military, one that would serve the authorities and be 
composed of a new type of personnel – individuals from outside the army’s traditional power 
base. This reflects the reshuffle of the elites that happened during AKP’s rule.
However, due to the fact that the TSK are a highly complex structure and the political situation 
both in Turkey itself and in its neighbourhood is tense, the military needs to retain its signif-
icance within the state system. Military actions are being carried out in northern Syria and 
in the south-eastern part of Turkey. In a situation of profound distrust between the political 
leadership and the military, the government is trying to impact the internal divisions within 
the TSK by favouring anti-Western, pro-Russian and nationalist groups. At the same time, it is 
consolidating the interior ministry’s structures, which could potentially defend it against an-
other possible coup. It is also forming voluntary structures subordinated to it. This means that 
the process of the armed forces’ reconstruction and redefinition of their role in the system, 
alongside the ultimate creation of a new army, are markedly elevating the potential for inter-
nal conflicts and translating into a weakening of Turkey’s institutional ties with the West by 
gradually weakening its involvement in NATO. The planned purchase of S-400 systems from 
Russia, which the government intends to use to defend itself against its own army, is another 
manifestation of this trend.
TSK – the institutional core  
of the Turkish Republic
The significance of the armed forces for the po-
litical system of contemporary Turkey is deter-
mined by the central role they have unceasingly 
played in the Turkish state since the first half of 
the 19th century. The issue is multifaceted and 
cannot merely be reduced to the role of ‘the 
guardian of secularism’, the mantle which the 
TSK have traditionally assumed in the Republic. 
Due to its strong Kemalist identity, the military 
has traditionally gathered political, clerical and 
economic elites, as well as opinion-forming 
groups around it. In this way it has served as 
a keystone of the system as a whole, in which 
political hegemony (combined with an econom-
ic and cultural one) was held by elites stemming 
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from the period of the late Ottoman Empire1. 
It was because of this traditional position that 
for most of Turkey’s history as a republic the 
TSK were not ancillary to the state – on the 
contrary, they took charge of the political class 
(Turkish: vesayet sistemi). Whenever it was con-
sidered necessary, the military toppled the gov-
ernment (coup d’états in 1960 and 1980 and 
forced resignations of entire governments in 
1971 and 1997), and changed the legal order 
– for example, new constitutions were adopted 
in the wake of the coups in 1960 and 1980. 
At present, the TSK remain a powerful institu-
tional and bureaucratic machine – the combined 
land, air and naval forces have over 362  000 
soldiers2. In addition, the military police is more 
than 150 000-strong and the reserve has almost 
380 000 soldiers. Due to the large number of 
TSK troops and their social power base, com-
posed mainly of families with military traditions 
going back generations that are closely linked 
to traditional lay republican elites, the military 
1 The so-called “White Turks”, i.e. Ottoman elites that 
took part in the creation of the Republic and as secular 
Kemalist elites held a dominant position in it until the 
first two terms of AKP. Alternatively, they are referred to 
as society’s ‘centre’ and their roots can be traced to res-
idents of the Balkans and the Caucasus who were serv-
ants in the Ottoman state. They have cultural, economic 
and social capital and dominate society’s ‘periphery’, 
mainly the religious peasant population of Anatolia. 
Şerif Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turk-
ish Politics?, “Daedalus”, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional 
Societies (Winter, 1973), p. 169-190 and: Jenny White, 
Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton and Oxford 2014, p. 46-48.
2 The most recent information on the number of TSK’s 
troops of all types was announced in February 2017. See 
TSK’nın Şubat 2017 Personel Mevcutları, MSI Dergisi, 
1 February 2017; http://www.milscint.com/tr/tsknin-sub-
at-2017-personel-mevcutlari/ 
continues to hold an important position in the 
Turkish political system. This position endures 
mainly due to the army’s economic influence. 
The main institution through which the TSK 
are pursuing their interests in this field is the 
Armed Forces Retirement Fund (Ordu Yardım-
laşma Kurumu – OYAK). This institution is inde-
pendent of civilian leadership and in practice is 
a powerful conglomerate that is exempt from 
taxes and controls almost all key sectors of the 
economy3.
Despite the fact that under AKP rule the posi-
tion of the TSK is becoming ever weaker, the 
military maintains its traditional prestige, its 
symbolic value and its social and economic in-
fluence. It is also a palpable instrument in the 
state’s domestic and foreign policy. Since the 
mid-1980s, it has been involved in military ac-
tion targeting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) in the south-eastern part of Turkey. This 
trend intensified when the war in Syria broke 
out. Turkish troops have been involved in mil-
itary action under Operation Euphrates Shield 
(since August 2016) and Operation Olive Branch 
(since January 2018). Due to permanent threats 
to the Turkish state, both internal and external, 
in a situation of tensions between the govern-
ment and the military leadership the position of 
the military as an institution of key importance 
for the Turkish state is maintained.
3 In 2009, OYAK had a stake in 60 companies and fully con-
trolled 29 companies. The total value of OYAK’s assets 
was 28.3 billion Turkish liras (around US$ 18.8 billion). 
Its operates in sectors such as construction, finance, 
metallurgy, automotive production (it cooperates with 
Renault), IT and banking (outside Turkey). Ismet Akça, 
Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present situa-
tion, Problems and Solutions, TESEV Publications, July 
2010, p. 10. Following the purges carried out as a re-
sult of the failed coup organised in July 2016, OYAK’s 
business dealings remained practically unchanged. 
Moreover, in the autumn of 2017 the fund’s executives 
announced their plan to return to the Turkish banking 
sector and continue its construction investments. See 
Kerim Karakaya, Ercan Ersoy, Vernon Wessels, Turkey’s 
Oyak Group Seeking Opportunity to Return to Banking, 
“Bloomberg”, 2 October 2017; https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-10-02/turkey-s-oyak-evaluat-
ing-opportunities-in-banking-sector-ceo 
Due to its strong Kemalist identity, the 
military has traditionally gathered the 
country’s elites around it and consolidat-
ed the system as a whole.
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Organisational changes around TSK – 
the sine qua non of the construction 
of a New Turkey
The failed attempted coup of 15 July 2016 is the 
most important turning point in the process of 
institutional and social reconstruction of the 
Turkish state. This reconstruction process is rev-
olutionary in its nature and has been ongoing 
since 20024. The coup has been the most sig-
nificant upheaval in Turkish politics since AKP 
took power. It has also shown that the military 
is indeed the source of power that is able to at-
tempt toppling President Erdoğan5. The failed 
attempt at overthrowing his rule has become 
a catalyst of the process that has been ongoing 
for years and whose aim is to permanently sub-
ordinate the military to civilian government6. 
The state of emergency declared immediately 
after the coup enabled the president to issue 
decrees and made it possible to launch actions 
intended mainly to eliminate the immediate 
threat by expelling individuals linked to the 
Gülen movement from the military. Other ac-
tions included system-wide measures leading 
to the ultimate formal subordination of the TSK 
to civilian government.
Under the purges that followed the coup, 124 
generals and admirals (30% of the command) 
4 M. Chudziak, The coup as a founding myth. The ideo-
logical pillars of the New Turkey, OSW Point of View, 
13 October 2017; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikac-
je/point-view/2017-10-13/coup-a-founding-myth-ideo-
logical-pillars-new-turkey
5 The events that took place on 15 July 2016 are mainly pre-
sented as a joint victory of the Turkish nation, its leader 
and the loyal portion of the military that did not support 
the plotters. Leaving aside the doubts as to the actual per-
petrators from the Gülen movement, this version of the 
events lifts the blame from the military as such. Ibidem, 
p. 23-25. For more on Gülen’s supporters within the TSK 
see Dexter Filkins, Turkey’s Thirty-Year Coup, ”New York-
er”, 17 October 2016; http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup 
6 This process has been ongoing since the beginning 
of AKP’s second term. See Jakub Wódka, Relacje cy-
wilno-wojskowe. Aspekty instytucjonalne, [in:] Idem 
(ed.), „Nowa” Turcja. Aspekty polityczne, gospodarcze 
i społeczne, ISP PAN, Warsaw 2015, p. 111-135.
were removed from the military, and more than 
40 000 servicemen were expelled from the of-
ficers’ corps as a whole. More than 8 000 in-
dividuals were arrested, including both officers 
and soldiers, and civilian personnel7. These 
measures were mainly intended to immediately 
eliminate people linked to the Gülen movement 
or suspected of having such links8. 
However, actions of a fundamental nature 
covered all formal relationships between the 
government and TSK. The decrees issued by 
President Erdoğan in the autumn of 2016 and 
at the beginning of 2017 have formed the le-
gal basis for these actions. All of the imple-
mented changes have solidified the civilian 
government’s formal control of the TSK in 
that they eliminated the actual autonomy of 
the General Staff as an institution that central-
ly manages all the branches of armed forces. 
Several different centres of control have been 
established in its place.
7 In April 2018, the minister of defence announced that 
another round of purges was being prepared, intend-
ed to cover around 3000 individuals identified as secret 
supporters of the Gülen movement. TSK içindeki 3 bin 
kripto ihraç edilecek, “Milliyet”, 19 April 2018.
8 Taking account of the controversy regarding the purg-
es’ reach, it should be noted that Kemalist military cir-
cles supported the purges immediately. One example 
of this is a statement from former chief of staff Gen. 
İlker Başbuğ, who said that the TSK had long required 
a purge to remove Gülen’s supporters from its ranks, 
and the coup itself was not masterminded by the mil-
itary. Başbuğ’a göre 15 Temmuz ‘askeri darbe’ değil: 
MİT bize sekiz yıl bilgi vermedi, “Diken”, 1 August 2016; 
http://www.diken.com.tr/basbuga-gore-15-temmuz-
askeri-darbe-degil-mit-bize-sekiz-yil-bilgi-vermedi/ 
All of the implemented changes have so-
lidified the civilian government’s formal 
control of the TSK in that they nullified 
the actual autonomy of the General Staff.
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Other organisational changes9 affecting the 
relations between the civilian government and 
the military involved excluding the gendarmerie 
and the coast guard from the General Staff’s 
command. The ministry of the interior has as-
sumed control of these two services. As a result 
of this move, more than 160 000 officers have 
been excluded from the General Staff’s chain 
of command. Command of land, air and na-
val forces has been transferred directly to the 
ministry of defence, and the role of the General 
Staff, which until recently controlled them, has 
been reduced to coordination of their actions. 
The changes discussed above should be viewed 
as revolutionary. This is the first time since the es-
tablishment of a republican system of governance 
that the armed forces are so evidently subordinat-
ed to the government. Unprecedented purges 
– both in the command hierarchy and at lower 
echelons – raise questions regarding the TSK’s 
combat capacity. The two operations carried out 
in northern Syria were rather small-scale. Never-
theless, they have made it possible to achieve the 
planned goals, which shows that the Turkish mil-
itary is capable of carrying out actions to imple-
ment ad hoc objectives. 
Cadres decide everything 
The changes affecting the control mecha-
nisms discussed above, and more impor-
tantly the purges, have paved the way for 
9 See M. Gürcan, Never Again! But How? State and the 
Military in Turkey after July 15, Istanbul Policy Center, 
April 2017, p. 11.; http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/04/Never-Again_Metin-Gurcan.pdf 
launching the process of forming a new army, 
a structure of a different ideological nature, 
composed of individuals who were promot-
ed under AKP rule. First, attempts at reshuf-
fling the military personnel were made at the 
beginning of AKP’s time in office, which was 
facilitated by Turkey’s EU membership am-
bitions. The EU itself offered its support for 
these initiatives, viewing them as an impor-
tant element in the state’s democratisation. 
It was only in 2016 that more comprehensive 
measures than a mere reshuffle of former 
personnel were launched. The present chang-
es are intended to form a brand new mili-
tary class. While this new class is still being 
formed, the government is playing a political 
game, favouring certain groups, provoking 
conflicts within the military and showing that 
loyal cooperation with the authorities guar-
antees survival.
The officer promotion system has been sub-
ordinated to civilian government. All promo-
tions from the rank of lieutenant are approved 
by the minister of national defence (until re-
cently the General Staff was responsible for 
this). Other major reforms included the dis-
solution of officer schools supervised by the 
General Staff and the creation of the state-run 
National Defence University in its place. The 
University is a civilian establishment, has 
a new curriculum and is supervised by the 
Ministry of Defence. Other measures included 
the dissolution of military courts, while mili-
tary hospitals have been handed over to the 
ministry of health and several companies run 
by the military have been shut down. 
The final stage of the process of formally sub-
ordinating the TSK to civilian government in-
volved the creation of a new formula for the 
Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askerî Şûra 
– YAŞ). This is the TSK’s key decision making 
body when it comes to personnel issues. In 
2017, for the first time, representatives of the 
government outnumbered the other Council 
members – they included the prime minister 
The present changes are intended to form 
a brand new military class. While this new 
class is being formed, the government is 
playing a political game and provoking 
conflicts within the military.
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and his five deputies, as well as the ministers 
of defence, justice, the interior and foreign 
affairs (10 members in total). The TSK are rep-
resented by the chief of the General Staff and 
the commanders of land, air and naval forces. 
This means that the TSK’s main decision mak-
ing body for personnel affairs has been dom-
inated by the government, whose role until 
recently was to merely approve any decisions 
taken by TSK as an autonomous entity. In the 
present format, the roles have been reversed 
– the General Staff and the commanders of 
specific forces act as advisors and formulate 
proposals, and the government takes final 
decisions.
Regardless of all the institutional transfor-
mations discussed above, a widespread be-
lief remains in Turkey that it is necessary to 
minimise the risk of a possible counter-strike 
by the military. This is why actions are being 
carried out to marginalise officers who grad-
uated from Western universities and have ex-
perience in serving in NATO missions, and to 
promote groups that are neutral towards the 
government or support it. In 2017, 61 colo-
nels were promoted to the rank of general, 
several officers who had been expelled from 
service during the Balyoz and Ergenekon 
show trials10 were also promoted. This means 
that the government wants to cooperate with 
officers that it formerly fought in league with 
the Gülen movement. 
10 In these two trials respectively 254 and 325 officers and 
businessmen were expelled or sentenced to many years 
in prison. In 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that they 
were show trials and the body of evidence was fabri-
cated by members of the Gülen movement who were 
employees of the judiciary. In August 2017, eight navy 
officers, previously expelled from service in the Balyoz 
trial, were promoted. See Kumpas mağdurları da terfi 
etti, “Cumhuriyet”, 4 August 2017; http://www.cum-
huriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/795914/Kumpas_magdur-
lari_da_terfi_etti.html. In 2016, six officers with similar 
history were promoted. See Balyoz davalarında beraat 
eden subaylar terfi etti, “Sabah”, 29 July 2016, https://
www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/07/29/balyoz-daval-
arinda-beraat-eden-subaylar-terfi-etti 
Four basic ideological factions have formed 
within the TSK: conservative, nationalist, ‘Eur-
asian’ and ‘Atlantic’11. In practice, each faction, 
excluding the conservative one, has a reserved 
or neutral approach towards the project of 
a New Turkey. This is where the space for polit-
ical maneouvres opens up to the government. 
In this situation, for instance, the nationalists 
can remain neutral in exchange for a certain 
minimum of economic privileges and prestige 
for the military being upheld. The government 
is playing also its game by favouring the ‘Eur-
asian’ faction and marginalising the ‘Atlantic’ 
faction. These actions have the most significant 
impact on the New Turkey’s geopolitical orien-
tation. In short, this indicates a major enhance-
ment in the status of the group centred around 
the Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi) led by Doğu 
Perinçek, once a Maoist. At present, he is Tur-
key’s best known promoter of Russia’s neo-Eur-
asianism ideology created by Aleksandr Dugin. 
This group is clearly very numerous within the 
TSK and supports the idea of breaking away 
from NATO and starting close collaboration with 
Russia. It supports the government’s attempts 
to make the New Turkey a nationalist coun-
11 The conservative faction supports the government and 
has a sentimental attachment to Turkey’s Ottoman past; 
the nationalists are mainly representatives of old Ke-
malist and anti-Western groups; the ‘Eurasians’ stem 
from nationalist and pro-Russian left-wing parties, and 
the supporters of the ‘Atlantic’ option are officers who 
graduated from Western universities and support the 
view that Turkey should maintain and strengthen its re-
lationships with NATO. See more: Metin Gürcan, 15 Tem-
muz sonrası TSK ve dönüşüm, „T24.com.tr”, 14 August 
2016, http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/metin-gurcan/15-tem-
muz-sonrasi-tsk-ve-donusum,15246 
The AKP is not satisfied with creating 
a polycentric model of formal control and 
developing political cooperation with 
the TSK. It also intends to protect itself 
against another political earthquake.
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try. This approach is facilitated by a narrative 
emphasising important events from Turkey’s 
national history and public feelings connect-
ed with them. The government has intention-
ally stoked these sentiments since mid-2015. 
In addition, this situation is creating new op-
portunities for Russian propaganda, which the 
Kremlin consistently uses12. It also leads to the 
marginalisation of officers who are graduates 
of Western military schools and have experi-
ence in serving in NATO missions13. A weakening 
of this type of military personnel or its open mar-
ginalisation are elements of a consistent loos-
ening of Turkey’s ties with NATO. These ties are 
the most important institutional link between 
Turkey and the West. 
Security measures and alternative 
structures
The final element of AKP’s reconstruction of 
Turkish armed forces involves the creation and 
consolidation of a military structure that could 
serve as an alternative to the TSK, counterbal-
ance the influence the military has on the state 
and be able to offer security measures should 
12 Cf an interview with Aleksandr Dugin for the pro-govern-
ment ”Habertürk” newspaper in which he comments on the 
failed coup referring to it as an initiative inspired not so much 
by the Gülen movement as by Washington, thereby clearly 
stoking anti-American views that are widespread in Turkey, 
the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, as well as 
anti-liberal and anti-Western resentments. Prof. Aleksandr 
Dugin’den Türkiye’ye uyarı: ABD yüklenecek B planı yapın, 
“Habertürk”, 6 November 2017; http://www.haberturk.com/
prof-aleksandr-dugin-den-turkiye-ye-uyari-1701639 
13 L. Jacinto, Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge and Erdogan’s Private 
Army, “Foreign Policy”, 13 July 2017; http://foreignpolicy.
com/2017/07/13/turkeys-post-coup-purge-and-erdogans-
private-army-sadat-perincek-gulen/ 
another coup be organised. The consolidated 
structures are mainly based on forces that de-
fended the government during the failed coup, 
both those supervised by the interior ministry 
and those composed of civilian volunteers. In 
this sense, the reconstruction of security struc-
tures is designed to reflect social changes that 
happened during AKP rule.
The introduction of serious institutional chang-
es, the plans to train new personnel and the 
skilful management of internal divisions have 
not eliminated the government’s traditional 
distrust of the military. The distrust is so deep 
and the permanent sense of threat so strong 
that the AKP is not satisfied with creating 
a polycentric model of formal control and de-
veloping political cooperation with the TSK.
It also intends to consolidate other structures 
to protect itself against another political earth-
quake. In this context, the key role is played by 
Special Police Units (Polis Özel Harekat – PÖH) 
that were strengthened during the state of 
emergency. They are composed of 45  000–
50  000 well-trained and well-armed officers 
operating mainly in cities14. In non-urban areas, 
a similar role is played by relevant units of gen-
darmerie (Jandarma Özel Harekat - JÖH), which 
are supervised by the interior ministry, just like 
the police15.
The most spectacular manifestation of the gov-
ernment’s permanent distrust of the military 
has been the close cooperation of President 
Erdoğan with a privately-owned company, 
14 Similar units existed in the 1990s. During the rule of the 
Welfare Party, the predecessor of AKP, after the forced 
resignation of the entire government in 1997 the mili-
tary caused their disarmament. At present, the fact that 
they are stationed in cities is directly seen as a form of 
the government’s protection against a possible confron-
tation with the military. Ceng Sangic, Erdoğan and His 
Allies: A Populist Legitimacy, “Turkeycope”, vol. 2. No. 3, 
February 2018, Moshe Dayan Center; https://dayan.org/
content/erdo%C4%9F-and-his-allies-populist-legitimacy 
15 The military police, which was subordinated to the Gen-
eral Staff for decades, remains a problematic structure. 
In practice, its operations and training are of military na-
ture. See M. Gürcan, M. Gisclon, Turkey’s Security Sector 
after July 15: Democratizing Security or Securitizing the 
State?, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Winter 2017, p. 76-77.
In connection with Erdoğan’s close links 
to SADAT, a major controversy was 
sparked by reports that the company al-
legedly organises training camps for the 
civilian population.
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SADAT. It is likely that this company trains ci-
vilian supporters of the government, thereby 
forming armed militias that could act if the gov-
ernment is threatened. In 2016, SADAT’s CEO, 
Gen. Adnan Tanrıverdı, was appointed the pres-
ident’s chief security advisor. He was expelled 
from military service in 1997 for his Islamic 
views. On its website, his company presents 
itself as “Turkey’s first and only” private com-
pany to offer advice, training and provision of 
military supplies16. SADAT employs former TSK 
officers. The content of the company’s website 
suggests that it operates both in Turkey and in 
the Muslim world as a whole. The company’s 
rhetoric is full of anti-Western resentment and 
references to actions that are “intended to fa-
cilitate the consolidation of the military poten-
tial of Muslim states and to restore their due 
place among global superpowers”17. 
In connection with Erdoğan’s close links to SA-
DAT, a major controversy was sparked by re-
ports suggesting that the company allegedly 
organises training camps for the civilian popu-
lation. This information was communicated at 
the beginning of 2018 by Meral Akşener, for-
mer interior minister, currently chairwoman of 
the opposition Good Party (İyi Parti - İP). Ac-
cording to her, training events were organised 
in Konya and Tokat provinces, where armed 
civilians could be spotted in the streets. The 
revelations from Ms Akşener coincided with 
President Erdoğan’s state of emergency decree 
no. 696, which states that civilians who took 
part in fighting during the 2016 coup will not 
be brought to justice18. Critics of this legislation 
claim that in practice it gives immunity to armed 
groups of civilians, who use violence under the 
pretext of counteracting terrorism. SADAT’s 
spokesperson immediately denied the reports 
regarding the camps and said that the compa-
16 See http://www.sadat.com.tr/tr/ 
17 Ibidem.
18 Akşener, SADAT’ı işaret etti: Tokat ve Konya’da silahlı 
eğitim kampları bulunduğunu duyuyoruz, „Gazete Karın-
ca”, 2 January 2018; http://gazetekarinca.com/2018/01/
aksener-sadati-isaret-etti-tokat-ve-konyada-silahli-egit-
im-kamplari-bulundugunu-duyuyoruz/ 
ny offers training and advisory services outside 
Turkey, in “friendly and allied” countries19. The 
reports on the alleged training events, the con-
troversial presidential decree and the videos re-
vealed showing how people in civilian clothes, 
wearing bulletproof vests and holding machine 
guns, disarm soldiers who took part in the at-
tempted coup20, are a credible confirmation of 
the thesis that security structures parallel to the 
military really exist21.
The most recent manifestation of President 
Erdoğan’s distrust of the TSK is the fact that 
in Turkey it is no secret that the controversial 
plans to purchase S-400 air defence systems 
from Russia are determined not so much by the 
intention to use them in combat against troops 
of other NATO states, as by the plan to retain 
them as weapons against the Turkish Air Force. 
The air defence installations are to be deployed 
in the Akıncı military base near Ankara. Individ-
uals involved in the attempted coup included, in 
particular, representatives of the air force, and 
this is why the location of the S-400 systems is 
both intended to have a symbolic significance 
and to serve the purpose of defending the pres-
ident against the Turkish military. Systems that 
are compatible with the equipment used by 
NATO could not be used for this purpose22. 
19 Meral Akşener’in “Tokat ve Konya’da silahlı eğitim kam-
pları kuruldu” iddiasına ilişkin SADAT’tan açıklama, 
“T24.com.tr”, 5 January 2018; http://t24.com.tr/haber/
meral-aksenerin-tokat-ve-konyada-silahli-egitim-kamp-
lari-kuruldu-iddiasina-iliskin-sadattan-aciklama,528553 
20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHhqE7nPSrM 
21 L. Jacinto, op. cit.
22 Howard Eisenstadt, Uneasy Rests the Crown: Erdoğan 
and ‘Revolutionary Security’ In Turkey, POMED, 20 De-
cember 2018; http://pomed.org/pomed-snapshot-un-
easy-rests-the-crown-erdogan-and-revolutionary-secu-
rity-in-turkey/ 
The essential change that is happening 
under AKP rule, and whose gradual im-
plementation accelerated after 2016, is 
the subordination of the armed forces to 
the policy pursued by the government.
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Conclusions and prospects
The consistent and multi-layered reconstruction 
of the state apparatus as a whole, which the AKP 
has been carrying out since it took power, accel-
erated in pace and went on to encompass the TSK 
in the aftermath of the failed coup. However, a 
serious redefinition of the role of the military in 
Turkey does not mean that its significance has 
been markedly reduced. The essential change 
that is happening during AKP’s rule, and whose 
gradual implementation accelerated after 2016, 
is the subordination of the armed forces to the 
policy pursued by the government. The TSK are 
pursuing the state’s foreign policy goals by carry-
ing out military operations abroad. Formerly, the 
armed forces’ far-reaching autonomy seriously 
hampered this type of activity, and in domestic 
politics it forced the authorities to negotiate. This 
element of Turkish politics is now disappearing in 
connection with the present changes. It is highly 
likely that, depending on state policy needs and 
the goals set by the government, similar opera-
tions will be carried out in the future as well. This 
is intended to show that regardless of the purges 
the TSK are capable of carrying out military ac-
tion, maintaining their prestige and actively coop-
erating with the civilian government by pursuing 
its goals. However, the limited scale of the present 
operations prevents a comprehensive assessment 
of the Turkish army’s combat capability. 
One important change that is now taking place 
is that while new personnel are being trained 
and their ideological views are changing, old 
personnel are subject to interference by the 
government. In this context, the most impor-
tant link between the government and specific 
centres within the TSK is the strong anti-West-
ern resentment and orientation towards ac-
tions that are divergent from the policy of other 
NATO states (the USA’s support for the Kurds 
in Syria and Turkish operations targeting them). 
In the short term, this cooperation will have 
a significant impact on the development of 
tensions between Turkey and NATO. This lack 
of cohesion will likely grow as the traditionally 
strong position of pro-Russian groups within 
the TSK will be maintained. 
For the government, the introduction of 
a permanent civilian control of the army, the 
prospect of a system-wide personnel reshuffle 
and cooperation with the most anti-Western 
groups within the TSK are no guarantee of 
a comprehensive protection against another 
coup. In Turkey, the relationship between ci-
vilian government and the military is still char-
acterised by enormous mutual distrust. Inter-
nal friction within the Turkish state not only 
results in Turkey’s institutional ties with the 
West being challenged but also impacts the 
process of consolidation of law enforcement 
agencies and the state’s militarisation. 
